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This article analyses possible targets for the Italian debt-to-GDP ratio with
a small macroeconomic model. The role of international macroeconomic
variables such as the US GDP growth, prices of raw materials, EUR/USD
exchange rate and European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy stance
and domestic policy instruments is analysed in the debt dynamics. We find
that external conditions play a fundamental role for the Italian fiscal
consolidation. To reach a target of 100% of debt-to-GDP ratio by 2020, a
further growth-sustaining policy has to be implemented.
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I. Introduction
This article analyses the dynamics of the Italian gov-
ernment debt-to-GDP ratio using a small-scale model.
Our approach follows earlier works of Favero (2002),
Favero and Marcellino (2005) and Hasko (2007).
Adopting various scenarios for the exogenous vari-
ables, namely US GDP growth, oil price change,
long-term interest rates and euro versus dollar
exchange rate, we predict that the debt ratio can
reach a target of 100% by 2020 for fiscal consolidation
and sustainability. Section II presents the basic arith-
metic of debt accounting. Section III presents a brief
description of the model and its structure. Section IV
presents the empirical results. Section V shows that
under plausible assumptions our target of 100% ratio
for debt to GDP can be achieved. Section VI
concludes.
II. Arithmetic of Debt Accounting
The dynamics of debt accumulation can be described
with the identities in Equations 1 and 2:
Bt ¼ Bt1 þ itBt1  PBt (1)
where Bt ¼ nominal general government debt at the
end of year t, i ¼ the nominal interest paid on govern-
ment debt, PB=primary advance which equals tax
revenue less government expenditure (T–G). The same
relation holds if the variables are measured in real
terms assuming that inflation rate is measured with
the GDP deflator and we shall use this assumption
in our estimation. Normally the budget dynamics is
written in the form of a change in the ratio of public
debt-to-GDP (b):
bt ¼ it  pt  gtð Þ  bt1  pbt (2)
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where variables in lower case denote the same vari-
ables expressed as ratios to GDP, p ¼ inflation rate,
g ¼ real GDP growth. According to Equation 2, for a
given pb, a stronger real GDP growth, a lower nom-
inal interest rate and a higher inflation rate will reduce
the debt growth dynamics.
III. Modelling Debt: A Small Macroeconomic
Model
Identity 2 can be used in two different ways: as a single
residual equation, incorporating the scenarios for pri-
mary balance, growth, inflation and interest rate,
determining the debt-to-GDP dynamics, or as an
equation in a more complex model to account for
interactions among the key variables. More recently,
Favero and Marcellino (2005) and Hasko (2007) esti-
mated small-scale simultaneous equation models for
this purpose and we follow their approach. Our model
consists of five equations and the endogenous vari-
ables are driven by three international variables (US
GDP growth, oil price dynamics, EUR/USD
exchange rate and domestic short-term Central Bank
monetary policy rate). The model is as follows:
gt ¼ a1 þ a2pbt1 þ a3gUSt þ a4it þ a5it1 þ egt
ðoutput equationÞ (3)
pbt ¼ a6 þ a7pbt1 þ a8gt þ a9bt1 þ epbt
ðfiscal ruleÞ (4)
bt ¼ a10 þ a11bt1 þ a12bt2 þ a13gt þ a14bt2  iLt1
þ a15pt þ ebt ðpublic debt equationÞ (5)
pt ¼ a16 þ a17pt1 þ a18gt1 þ a19pbt1 þ a20oilt þ ept
ðinflation equationÞ ð6Þ
iLt ¼ a21þ a22iLt1þ a23iLt2þ a24itþ a25ptþ a26bt
þ a27eurot1
þ eit ðlong-term interest rate equationÞ (7)
where g ¼ real GDP growth, gUS ¼ real US GDP
growth, oil ¼ oil price percentage change (expressed
in euro), iL ¼ nominal long-term interest rate, b ¼
debt-to-GDP ratio, i ¼ nominal short-term interest
rate, p ¼ Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate,
euro ¼ euro versus dollar exchange rate and pb ¼
primary balance as percent of GDP. Data are yearly
and the estimation period is from 1970 to 2010. Details
of data definition and sources are cited in the
Appendix.
A brief explanation of the structure of themodel is as
follows: The output equation (Equation 3) embodies
three effects – a restrictive fiscal policy effect (a2<0)
captured by an increase in the primary balance, amone-
tary policy effect (a4 þ a5<0) measured as the
European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy rate
and an international business cycle effect (a3>0) cap-
tured byUSGDP growth rate. The fiscal policy effect is
negative (a2<0) due to the high tax rates in Italy. The
short-term interest rate has also a negative overall effect
on growth.1 The primary balance Equation 4 depends
on both output growth and debt-to-GDP ratio in a
positive way (a8>0 and a9>0). Similar results are
also found for Italy by Favero and Marcellino (2005).
The debt-to-GDP ratio is explained in Equation 5. We
consider the long-term interest rate as a proxy for the
average cost of debt because the Italian government
debt duration is getting longer and closer to the dura-
tion of long-term bonds. All signs in the equation are as
expected, that is a13<0, a14>0 and a15<0: Inflation in
Equation 6 depends positively on oil price growth and
output growth (a20>0 and a18>0).
2 The primary bal-
ance exerts a negative effect on inflation (a19<0). Two
offsetting effects are to be accounted when considering
the inflation response to the primary balances: a stimu-
lus to inflation acting via costs (usually linked to an
increase in indirect taxation) and a depressive effect due
to the decrease of private spending due to the tax
burden. We expect the latter effect to dominate. In
Equation 7 the long-term interest rate depends posi-
tively on the short-term interest rate (a24>0), on infla-
tion (a25>0), on debt-to-GDP ratio (a26>0) and on
the euro exchange rate versus dollar (a27>0). Finally,
the higher the level of Italian debt the higher is the long-
term interest rate due to higher risk premiums attached
to the Italian long-term bonds.
IV. Empirical Results
The system of Equations 3–7 is estimated as a simul-
taneous equation model using Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR) method with annual data for the
period 1970 to 2011. The results are in Table 1. The
results are impressive. All the coefficients have the
expected signs and are statistically significant. The
residual diagnostic tests for no serial correlation
(Portmanteau tests) and normality (Jarque–Bera
(JB)) of residuals do not reject the null hypotheses.
To check the reliability of the model to perform 10
1 We used the long-term interest rate and also the real interest rate in the output equation, but the results were poor. Similar
results were reported for Italy by Favero and Marcellino (2005).
2 Output growth is preferred as indicator for the overall level of activity instead of unemployment rate or output gap (Hasko,
2007).
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years of horizon forecasts, we also conducted the fol-
lowing exercise. We estimated the model from 1970 to
1999 and then forecasted for the next 10 years, com-
paring the out-of-sample forecasted values with the
historically recorded ones. The results are very satis-
factory but not reported to conserve space.
V. Scenarios and Debt-to-GDP Dynamic
Forecasts
Table 2 summarizes the outcomes of three scenarios
considered for the exogenous variables (baseline, an
upward/optimistic and a downward/risky scenario)
together with the results of endogenous variables.
The first three columns assume no policy intervention
and in the final column the outcome of a realistic
policy intervention is shown.
In Table 2 the debt-to-GDP ratio ranges from 102%
to 109%depending on the scenario. The main mechan-
ism behind the debt-to-GDP reduction relies on growth
of Italian economy. The positive effect of growth is
only partially offset by the increase in the long-term
interest rates. The Italian growth performance depends
heavily on the international scenario, so that the best
performance in terms of debt dynamics is conditioned
by international business cycle and a favourable oil
prices. An important role is played by the ECB mone-
tary policy.
In the last column of Table 2 we conducted a policy
intervention exercise with the aim to reach a 100% of
debt-to-GDP ratio compatible with 3% deficit limit of
Maastricht. In the most optimistic scenario, we cali-
brate a mix of interventions needed to reduce debt-to-
GDP ratio of 2% in order to reach a target value of
100%of debt-to-GDP ratio in 2020. From2011 to 2020
if the Italian government increases the GDP growth to
0.15% and cuts taxes to 0.12% of GDP, then the debt-
to-GDP ratio will reach the 100% in 2020 (Fig. 1) and
the Maastricht restriction of 3% will also hold.
VI. Conclusions
In this article we used a small-scale econometric model
for Italy to find a reasonable policy to reduce the debt
ratio to 100% of GDP within 10 years. Our simulation
results indicate that an external positive scenario is
Table 1. SUR method estimates of Italian debt dynamics (1970–2010)
gt ¼ a1 þ a2pbt1 þ a3gUSt þ a4it þ a5it1 þ eyt (output equation)
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 R2 JB (p-value)
0.0049 -0.2122 0.6260 0.5415 -0.5713 0.715 0.600
(0.005) (0.080) (0.086) (0.093) (0.083)
[0.921] [2.645] [7.315] [5.829] [6.901]
pbt ¼ a6 þ a7pbt1 þ a8gt þ a9bt1 þ epbt (fiscal rule)
a6 a7 a8 a9 R2 JB ( p-value)
-5.4804 0.6700 0.3427 0.0539 0.889 0.363
(1.054) (0.089) (0.087) (0.011)
[5.200] [7.521] [3.960] [4.708]
bt ¼ a10 þ a11bt1 þ a12bt2 þ a13gt þ a14bt2  iLt1 þ a15pt þ ebt (public debt equation)
a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 R2 JB (p-value)
15.8360 1.3554 -0.5056 -1.0594 0.4223 -0.3612 0.956 0.263
(2.187) (0.082) (0.074) (0.119) (0.092) (0.078)
[7.240] [16.442] [6.872] [8.889] [4.589] [4.643]
pt ¼ a16 þ a17pt1 þ a18gt1 þ a19pbt1 þ a20oilt þ ept (inflation equation)
a16 a17 a18 a19 a20 R2 JB (p-value)
0.0023 0.7904 0.2585 -0.2054 0.0432 0.926 0.157
(0.001) (0.059) (0.124) (0.109) (0.007)
[0.427] [13.390] [2.079] [1.892] [5.822]
iLt ¼ a21 þ a22iLt1 þ a23iLt2 þ a24it þ a25pt þ a26bt þ a27eurot1 þ eit (long-term interest rate equation)
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25 a26 a27 R2 JB (p-value)
-0.0506 0.8567 -0.2977 0.2625 0.2189 0.0464 0.0066 0.966 0.242
(0.020) (0.108) (0.089) (0.059) (0.050) (0.014) (0.004)
[2.555] [7.895] [3.331] [4.420] [4.352] [3.319] [1.898]
System residual Portmanteau tests for autocorrelations
Q-stat. (Lag 1) Q-stat. (Lag 2) Q-stat. (Lag 4) Q-stat. (Lag 6)
( p-value) ( p-value) ( p-value) ( p-value)
0.399 0.551 0.556 0.134
Notes: SUR, Seemingly Unrelated Regression; JB, Jarque–Bera. SEs and t-ratios are in parentheses and brackets, respectively.
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Fig. 1. Forecasts of macroeconomic variables for the period 2011 to 2020
Note: BASE, Base scenario; UP, Upside scenario; DOWN, Downside scenario; INT, Policy intervention scenario.
Table 2. Scenarios and macroeconomic analysis for 2011–2020
Baseline scenario Upside scenario Downside scenario
Policy
intervention
scenario
Nominal short-term interest rate (%) 4 3.5 3 3.5
2020 Oil price in US dollar and euro Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal
$200 (E165) $180 (E138) $165 (E126) $180 (E138)
Real Real Real Real
$161 (E124) $144 (E111) $132 (E101) $144 (E111)
Real US GDP growth (%) 2.2 2.6 1.6 2.6
EUR/USD Exchange rate 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
2020 Public debt (% of GDP)* 106 102 109 100
Primary balance (% of GDP)* 2.38 2.44 2.30 2.2
Nominal long-term interest rate* (%) 5.0 5.2 4.8 5.1
Inflation* (%) 2.3 2.7 2.0 2.9
Real GDP growth* (%) 1.5 1.8 1.1 2.0
General Government balance in % of GDP* 2.67 2.88 2.44 3.0
Notes: Real values for oil price change are calculated assuming an international average inflation of 2.2% for the period 2011 to
2020.
*Average values over the period.
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necessary for the international variables to bring down
the debt-to-GDP ratio under 105%. A dynamic inter-
national economy together with favourable oil prices
and not too strong euro are essential requirements.
Furthermore, an expansive stance by ECB monetary
policy helps to reach fiscal targets, reducing Italian
interest payments. The most important domestic vari-
able in the debt-to-GDP reduction process is the
growth of domestic output. We showed that a policy
intervention aimed to stimulate the GDP growth
over 1.8% allows to reach the target 100% debt-to-
GDP ratio.
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Appendix: Data Definition and Source: 1970–2010
Table 3.
Variable Definition Source
b Debt-to-GDP ratio AMECO–EUROSTAT
p Percentage change of CPI OECD Statistics
g Real GDP growth AMECO–EUROSTAT
gUS Real US GDP growth Federal Reserve Economic
Data (FRED)
pb Primary balance (total government revenues minus government
spending excluding interest payments)
AMECO–EUROSTAT
i Nominal short-term interest rate OECD statistics
iL Nominal long-term interest rate OECD statistics
oil West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil (expressed in euro)
percentage change
FRED
euro EUR/USD exchange rate DATASTREAM
(USEURFT)
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